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AN ATTEMPT TO NEGATE IRANIAN SANCTIONS:  HOW 
SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES MAY BE THE EU’S LAST 
HOPE TO KEEP THE JCPOA ALIVE 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
U.S. sanctions have had a palpable effect on Iran.1  Iran’s crude 
oil exports have plummeted,2 international companies forfeited their 
business agreements with Tehran months before the sanctions even took 
effect, and international financial entities are cutting ties with the Islamic 
Republic.3  However, European leaders are actively fighting to keep the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”) intact, with the hope that 
their efforts will keep Persia clear of nuclear weapons.4    
EU tactics have primarily been centered around protecting Ira-
nian-affiliated entities from  November 2018’s wave of secondary sanc-
tions.5  The sanctions forced countries and companies to make a choice 
between working with Iran or doing business with the financial institu-
tions and markets of the United States.6  Most companies are currently 
choosing to fall in line with the United States, in spite of the initial pro-
tections and U.S. financial institution aversion strategies that the EU has 
 
 1. Clifford Krauss, Trump Hit Iran With Oil Sanctions. So Far, They’re Working, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/19/business/energy-environ-
ment/iran-oil-sanctions.html. 
 2. Julian Lee, What’s Not to Like About Trump’s Iran Oil Sanctions?, BLOOMBERG 
(Sept. 30, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-09-30/what-s-
not-to-like-about-trump-iran-oil-sanctions-100-oil. 
 3. Ellen R. Wald, 10 Companies Leaving Iran as Trump’s Sanctions Close in, FORBES 
(June 6, 2018, 3:14 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenrwald/2018/06/06/10-compa-
nies-leaving-iran-as-trumps-sanctions-close-in/#6fd5fe14c90f. 
 4. Steven Erlanger, As U.S. Sanctions on Iran Kick in, Europe Looks for a Work 
Around, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/world/europe/us-
iran-sanctions-europe.html. 
 5. Marheen Khan, EU Launches Counter Measures Against US Sanctions on Iran, FIN. 
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/be32d010-9973-11e8-9702-
5946bae86e6d. 
 6. Krauss, supra note 1. 
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proposed.7  However, the EU is not yet out of options.8  It is possible that 
the recent EU-backed creation of a Special Purpose Vehicle (“SPV”) may 
effectively delay, or entirely prevent, the current impending demise of the 
JCPOA.9 
This Note proceeds in six parts.  Part II details the background of 
the JCPOA and reports the U.S. sanctions currently in place against 
Iran.10  Part III describes the objectives of the EU in pursuing its initial 
approach to lessen the impact of U.S. sanctions.11  Part IV discusses why 
the three main pillars of the EU’s initial strategy to salvage the JCPOA 
failed.12  Part V describes the recently announced SPV and how SPVs 
may be the EU’s best option moving forward.13  Part VI concludes this 
Note by describing the consequences of a financial system that avoids 
U.S. markets.14  
II. THE JCPOA AND RE-IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST 
IRAN 
In May of 2018, the Trump Administration announced that the 
United States would withdraw from an international agreement with Iran, 
the JCPOA.15  The JCPOA, otherwise known as the Iranian Nuclear Deal, 
was formed on July 14, 2015 and signed by Britain, China, Germany, 
France, Russia, the United States, and Iran.16  The success of the JCPOA 
itself was conditioned on a bargain: Iran agreed to “verifiably scale 
 
 7. Krauss, supra note 1.  
 8. See Esfandyar Batmanghelidj & Axel Hellman, How Europe Could Blunt U.S. Iran 
Sanctions Without Washington Lifting a Finger, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 3, 2018, 8:54 AM), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/03/how-europe-can-blunt-u-s-iran-sanctions-without-
washington-raising-a-finger-humanitarian-spv (describing various ways SPVs could be used 
to combat U.S. sanctions against Iran). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. See infra Part V. 
 14. See infra Part VI. 
 15. See Donald J. Trump, Pres. of the U.S., Remarks on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (May 8, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trump-joint-comprehensive-plan-action [hereinafter Trump’s Remarks]. 
 16. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/245317.pdf [hereinafter JCPOA]. 
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back”17 its nuclear development capabilities if the international commu-
nity removed some of the economic penalties placed on the country.18   
After the JCPOA was implemented, Iran began to benefit from 
increased access to the global economy.19  The International Monetary 
Fund (“IMF”) reported that in 2016, Iran’s GDP grew by 12.5%.20  Oil 
exports in the country also began to rise.21  Iran had exported around 1.1 
million barrels of oil per day before the JCPOA, but by early 2018 the 
Islamic Republic was estimated to have more than doubled their daily oil 
exportation.22  Additionally, the JCPOA increased employment in Iran, 
providing hope to Iranians for a better future.23  
Though economic conditions were improving, Iran’s growth un-
der the JCPOA was overall less than what the Iranian government ini-
tially expected.24  The JCPOA lifted certain sanctions against Iran, but 
some of “the most disruptive banking restrictions remained in place.”25  
The U.S. financial system was still unable to engage with Iran, and many 
major European banks refused to work within the Islamic Republic given 
the consequences that could result from violating the sanctions that were 
still enforceable.26  The 2016 U.S. presidential election also limited po-
tential economic growth in Iran.27  Republicans made clear their opposi-
tion to the JCPOA.28  International businesses capable of working within 
 
 17. JCPOA, supra note 16.  
 18. ESFANDYAR BATMANGHELIDJ & AXEL HELLMAN, EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP NETWORK, 
EUROPE, IRAN AND ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY:  A NEW BANKING ARCHITECTURE IN RESPONSE 
TO US SANCTIONS NETWORK 4-5 (2018) [hereinafter A New Banking Architecture]. 
 19. Amir Paivar, Nuclear Deal:  Is Iran’s Economy Better off Now, BBC NEWS (May 4, 
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43975498. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See id. (suggesting that initial growth reported by the IMF was all due to increase in 
oil exportation in the country). 
 22. Id.  
 23. See Negar Habibi, How the US Withdrawal From the Iran Nuclear Deal Will Affect 
Iran’s Economy, THE CONVERSATION (May 11, 2018. 8:44 AM), http://theconversa-
tion.com/how-the-us-withdrawal-from-the-iran-nuclear-deal-will-affect-irans-economy-
96476 (“[T]he deal did have some major effects on Iran’s economy.  It resulted in a doubling 
of Iran’s oil exports, helped stabilise the foreign exchange market, created jobs and – most 
importantly – optimism to the overall trend of the economy.”). 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Nora Kelly, Where the 2016 Candidates Stand on the Iranian Nuclear Deal, 
ATLANTIC (Sep. 1, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/where-the-
2016-candidates-stand-on-the-iran-nuclear-deal/448380/ (describing how the 2016 presiden-
tial candidates would respond to or alter the JCPOA if elected to serve as President of the 
United States).  
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the Islamic Republic were concerned about investing too many resources 
in Iran due to the potential impact of a Republican administration, and 
these concerns were amplified a couple of years later by the rhetoric of 
the Trump campaign.29 
Despite these concerns, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(“IAEA”) has consistently confirmed that Iran has remained compliant 
with the standards set by the nuclear agreement.30  In spite of this verified 
compliance, the Trump Administration followed through with its cam-
paign promise31 and withdrew the United States from the JCPOA in hope 
of making a new, more restrictive agreement with Iran.32  The Trump Ad-
ministration believes the JCPOA does not entirely deter Iran from engag-
ing in nuclear activity.33  Its hope is to find a more permanent solution to 
prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons in the future.34  The Trump 
Administration seeks a new deal that would require Iran to abandon its 
ballistic missile development program and cease the funding of militant 
groups that the United States classifies as terrorist organizations.35 
U.S. sanctions lifted under the JCPOA were re-introduced, and 
additional economic penalties were devised.36  Sanctions against Iran 
came in two waves, or wind-down periods, set by the U.S. Department of 
Treasury.37  The wind-down periods allowed both American and foreign 
 
 29. See Habibi, supra note 23 (discussing how U.S. politics impacted business decision 
of whether or not to invest in Iran). 
 30. See Press Release, IAEA Director General, Verification and Monitoring in the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) 
(Nov. 12, 2018) (describing Iran’s compliance with standards set by the JCPOA).  
 31. Trump’s Remarks, supra note 15.  
 32. Nicolas Miller, Trump Wants to Wring a ‘Better Deal’ from Iran. Here’s Why That’s 
So Unlikely, WASH. POST (May 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2018/05/08/trump-wants-to-wring-a-better-deal-from-iran-heres-why-thats-so-un-
likely/?utm_term=.2bb56db1cb45. 
 33. Trump’s Remarks, supra note 15. 
 34. See Trump’s Remarks, supra note 15 (“The agreement was so poorly negotiated that 
even if Iran fully complies, the regime can still be on the verge of a nuclear breakout in just a 
short period of time.”). 
 35. See Trump’s Remarks, supra note 15 (“Not only does the deal fail to halt Iran’s nu-
clear ambitions, but it also fails to address the regime’s development of ballistic missiles that 
could deliver nuclear warheads . . . [T]he deal does nothing to constrain Iran’s destabilizing 
activities . . . .”). 
 36. Rick Gladstone, Iran Sanctions Explained: US Goals, and the View from Tehran, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/world/middleeast/iran-
sanctions-explained.html.  
 37. Id.  
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entities time to withdraw their businesses and pull their money out of Iran 
before the sanctions took effect.38  
The first wave of sanctions, implemented in August 2018, tar-
geted the purchase or acquisition of U.S. dollar banknotes by the govern-
ment of Iran, Iran’s trade in gold or precious metals, transactions related 
to the purchase or sale of Iranian rials, the maintenance of significant 
funds or accounts outside the territory of Iran, and Iran’s automotive sec-
tor.39  The second wave of sanctions, implemented in November 2018, 
focused on Iran’s oil exports by blocking international dealings with Ira-
nian banks.40  Sanctions on oil-related transactions, transactions by for-
eign financial institutions with the Central Bank of Iran, specialized fi-
nancial messaging services to banks and Iranian financial institutions and 
the provision of underwriting services of insurance all have impacted 
Iran’s economy.41  
The United States has granted some exemptions to the sanc-
tions.42  Iran’s biggest oil customers, China and India, will not be penal-
ized for purchasing petroleum from Iran until at least May 2019,43 as long 
reductions in the amount of oil obtained can be demonstrated.44  Even 
despite the exemptions, Iran is feeling the impacts of U.S. forces.45  
The Iranian rial, the currency of the country, has suffered signif-
icantly.46  Throughout 2018, the rial lost more than 60% of its value.47  
 
 38. Ted Regencia, What Sanctions Will the US Reimpose Against Iran on Tuesday, 
ALJAZEERA (Aug, 6, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/sanctions-iran-snap-
tuesday-180804193910915.html. 
 39. U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING THE RE-
IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO THE MAY 8, 2018 NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL 
MEMORANDUM RELATING TO THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION (JCPOA) 1-2 
(2018). 
 40. Id. at 2-3.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Gardiner Harris, U.S. Reimposes Sanctions on Iran but Undercuts the Pain With 
Waivers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/02/world/mid-
dleeast/us-iran-sanctions-oil-waivers.html. 
 43. See Tom DiChristopher, Trump Administration Still Might Let Iran Export Oil, and 
That Could Lower Prices, CNBC (Jan. 15, 2019, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/15/trump-administration-leaves-the-door-open-to-letting-
iran-export-oil.html (“The State Department’s envoy to Iran is declining to say whether Wash-
ington will force oil buyers to cut off purchases of Iranian crude later this year.”).  
 44. See id. (“The waivers are designed to allow countries to continue buying Iranian 
crude so long as they demonstrate they are reducing their purchases.”).  
 45. Krauss, supra note 1. 
 46. Iran’s Central Bank Proposes Slashing Four Zeros from Falling Currency, REUTERS 
(Jan. 6, 2018, 6:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-currency/irans-central-
bank-proposes-slashing-four-zeros-from-falling-currency-irna-idUSKCN1P008C. 
 47. Id. 
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The state of Iranian currency is so poor that in January 2019 the Central 
Bank of Iran presented a bill to the government to remove four zeros from 
the rial in an attempt to counteract hyperinflation.48  Additionally, the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (“IMF”) estimated that Iran’s economy had 
shrunk by 1.5% in 2018, likely to be worsened by the 3.6% drop esti-
mated to occur in 2019.49   
The country’s oil and banking industries also continue to face 
hardship as international entities are largely unwilling to work with Iran 
and risk U.S. sanctions.50  The return of sanctions results in a lost oppor-
tunity for economic engagement for the Islamic Republic on an interna-
tional level,51 and Iran has warned that it will pull out of the JCPOA and 
restart its nuclear program if the remaining members of the deal fail to 
take action which serves Iran’s national economic interests.52  
III. THE EU’S OBJECTIVES IN PURSUING A MULTIFACETED APPROACH TO 
KEEP THE JCPOA INTACT 
European policymakers were motivated to act quickly in order to 
maintain the JCPOA after the United States announced that it would be 
withdrawing from the agreement.53  From the European perspective, sus-
taining economic exchange and credit investment with Iran is driven 
more by pragmatic security concerns than advancing EU economic 
gains,54 though some European companies have benefited from working 
within Iran.55  
 
 48. Id.  
 49. See IMF Data Mapper, INT’L MONETARY FUND (2018), https://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD/RN (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2019) (demonstrating IMF predictions regarding Iran’s economy via an interactive 
tool).  
 50. Gladstone, supra note 36.  
 51. A New Banking Architecture, supra note 18, at 1.   
 52. Michael Peel, Alex Barker, & Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Iran Threatens to Withdraw from 
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, FIN. TIMES (May 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/con-
tent/6dda41ac-6020-11e8-9334-2218e7146b04.  
 53. See Bryan R. Early, E.U. Countries Want to Save the Nuclear Deal. Don’t Expect 
Cooperation on U.S. Sanctions, WASH. POST (May 25, 2018), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/05/25/e-u-countries-want-to-save-the-iran-nu-
clear-deal-dont-expect-cooperation-on-u-s-sanctions/?utm_term=.b5c95ddaa362 (“The E.U. 
energy chief reassured Iranian officials that Europe would continue to honor the 2015 Iran 
nuclear agreement — despite the U.S. announcement this month that it would exit the agree-
ment.”). 
 54. A New Banking Architecture, supra note 18, at 1.   
 55. See Wald, supra note 3 (describing companies that had success investing in Iran un-
der the JCPOA that are now being forced to leave the Islamic Republic).  
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At first, the EU was confident in its ability to limit the impact of 
U.S. sanctions.56  Prior to the sanctions imposed under the Obama Ad-
ministration, Iran was able to trade with third-party entities subsequently 
evading U.S. efforts to isolate the country from economic exchange.57  It 
was only after the EU agreed to work with the United States by imposing 
penalties against Iran for sanction violations that the sanctions began to 
have any “bite.”58  
The Trump Administration was hoping to recreate the joint eco-
nomic pressure that led to the negotiation of the JCPOA.59 However, im-
mediately after Trump announced that sanctions would be returning, the 
EU pledged their full commitment to Iran and the JCPOA.60  The EU 
specifically promised to “mitigate the impact of [U.S.] sanctions on Eu-
ropean businesses”61 and planned to take steps to continue the interna-
tional business relations between the EU and Iran.62   
The EU’s initially planned response consisted of measures in-
tended to act on three main fronts with the common objective of securing 
and sustaining Iranian economic growth.63   Targeted measures pursued 
by the EU were: (1) paving the way for an alternative means of financing 
business transactions through the European Investment Bank (“EIB”); (2) 
encouraging member states to make direct bank transfers with the Central 
Bank of Iran (“CBI”) in order to continue to facilitate oil-related transac-
tions; and (3) launching a formal process to extend the EU blocking stat-
ute to cover the new U.S. measures.64 
 
 56. See Silvia Amaro, Europe Fights to Keep the Iran Nuclear Deal Intact After Trump 
Pulls Out, CNBC (May 9, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/09/europe-fights-to-keep-
the-iran-nuclear-deal-intact-after-trump-pulls-out.html (explaining the EU’s initial response 
to Trump’s May 8th announcement that the U.S. would be leaving the JCPOA).  
 57. Early, supra note 53. 
 58. Early, supra note 53. 
 59. Early, supra note 53. 
 60. See European Comm’n Press Release, European Commission Acts to Protect the In-
terests of EU Companies Investing in Iran as part of the EU’s Continued Commitment to the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (May 18, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
18-3861_en.htm (“European Commission acts to protect the interests of EU companies in-
vesting in Iran as part of the EU’s continued commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action.”). 
 61. Id.  
 62. See id. (“The [EU] is committed to mitigating the impact . . . and taking steps to 
maintain the growth of trade and economic relations between the EU and Iran that began when 
sanctions were lifted.  This can only be achieved by a combination of measures taken at na-
tional and European level.”). 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. 
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However, even before the second wave of Trump Administration 
sanctions were put into effect, the failure of the EU’s economic plan 
seemed inevitable.65   First, the EIB announced in July 2018 that the 
agency would refuse to lend to Iran.66  Second, the hesitation of European 
national banks to work directly with Iran was reinforced by the Islamic 
Republic’s unwillingness to comply with global anti-terror standards.67  
Third, it became apparent that the gaps within the EU’s blocking statute 
made its interpretation vague and its force essentially non-existent.68  
IV. THE INEVITABLE FAILURE OF THE EU’S INITIAL STRATEGY 
A. European Investment Bank’s Refusal to Lend to Iran 
Since liquidity is a significant issue in Iran,69 European officials 
assumed that the EIB would be able to support small- to medium- sized 
Iranian companies to offset the impact of the U.S. sanctions.70  However, 
the EIB has refused to lend to Iran.71  This refusal is for two main reasons.  
First, the EIB worries that any relationship with Iran would jeop-
ardize the organization’s U.S. relations.72  After the United States 
 
 65. John Irish & Robin Emmott, As U.S. Sanctions Near, Europe Fails to Protect Iran 
Deal, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2018, 11:12 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-
eu/as-u-s-sanctions-near-europe-fails-to-protect-iran-deal-idUSKCN1M41UO. 
 66. European Investment Bank Balks at Proposal to Offset U.S. Iran Sanctions, 
JERUSALEM POST (June 5, 2018, 4:26 PM), https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/European-In-
vestment-Bank-balks-at-proposal-to-offset-US-Iran-sanctions-559212. 
 67. Ruth Berschens, et al., EU Pressuring Central Banks to Help Iran, HANDELSBLATT 
GLOBAL (May 29, 2018 at 11:58 AM), https://global.handelsblatt.com/finance/eu-pressuring-
central-banks-iran-928936. 
 68. GIBSON DUNN, THE “NEW” IRAN E.O. AND THE “NEW” EU BLOCKING STATUTE, (Aug. 
9, 2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/new-iran-e-o-and-new-eu-blocking-statute-navi-
gating-the-divide-for-international-business. 
 69. Structural banking deficiencies and the explosion of semi-governmental organiza-
tions in Iran’s economy have resulted in the growth of liquidity held in bank accounts but this 
growth has not been on conjunction with the economic realities, such as production capacity.  
Additionally, the large pieces of the extra liquidity held in bank accounts have been moved 
towards the non-productive sector and “immovable assets.”  Hoorzan, Sanctions of Liquidity-
Which One Is More Dangerous for Iran’s Economy?, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Oct. 10, 2018), 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/sanctions-or-liquidity-which-one-is-more-
dangerous-for-iran-s-economy. 
 70. Beatriz Rios, EIB Cannot Do Business with Iran, Bank Chief Warns, EURATIV (July 
19, 2018),  https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eib-cannot-do-business-
with-iran-bank-chief-warns. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Alissa de Carbonnel & Robin Emmott, Under U.S. Pressure, EIB balks at EU Plan 
to Work in Iran, REUTERS (June 5, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-
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withdrew from the JCPOA, the EU quickly passed legislation to add Iran 
to the list of countries in which the EIB was legally able to conduct busi-
ness and subsequently began to pressure the EIB to find ways to support 
Iran in light of the impending sanctions.73  Yet, even EU legislation could 
not force the union’s own lending arm to work with Iran.74  
If the EIB had succumbed to the EU’s pressure, the EIB would 
have likely jeopardized its ability to raise money within U.S. markets.75  
The inability to work within U.S. markets would result in significant 
long-term consequences for EIB operations, as the EIB currently has 
€500 billion in outstanding bonds76 with roughly one-third of its lending 
operation dollar-denominated.77  The EIB raised $66 billion in 2017 on 
international capital markets and reasonably worried that the threat of 
U.S. sanctions against the EIB could scare off potential bond buyers.78  
Although the EU did budget a guarantee that would attempt to shield the 
entity against any losses derived from sanctions, they failed to offer a 
solution for the EIB to address funding risks.79  
Second, any engagement with Iran would risk the business model 
on which the EIB was formed.80  The EIB does not engage in jurisdictions 
categorized by the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”)81  as “high 
risk.”82 FATF expected Iran to quickly pass strict legislation to combat 
money laundering, especially in the midst of the re-imposition of U.S. 
sanctions, but hardliners in Iran’s Parliament were deeply opposed to ush-




 73. Robin Emmott & Alissa de Carbonnel, European Investment Bank Casts Doubt on 
EU plan to Salvage Nuclear Deal, REUTERS (July 18, 2018, 7:04 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/18/reuters-america-update-1-european-investment-bank-
cannot-invest-in-iran-eib-chief-says.html. [hereinafter EIB Casts Doubt]. 
 74. Rios, supra note 70. 
 75. de Carbonnel & Emmott, supra note 72. 
 76. EIB Casts Doubt, supra note 73. 
 77. de Carbonnel & Emmott, supra note 72. 
 78. de Carbonnel & Emmott, supra note 72. 
 79. de Carbonnel & Emmott, supra note 72. 
 80. EIB Casts Doubt, supra note 73. 
 81. See FATF, WHO WE ARE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) 
(“FATF is an inter-governmental body that has developed a series of recommendations cur-
rently recognized as the international standard for combating money laundering, the financing 
of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”). 
 82. de Carbonnel & Emmott, supra note 72.   
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FATF requirements.83  The strong opposition was mainly due to the fact 
that the implementation of FATF regulations would significantly hamper 
Iranian support for allied groups, including United States designated ter-
rorist entities.84   
FATF originally had given Iran until October 2018 to either im-
plement new standards to end the Islamic Republic’s support for terror 
financing or face the consequences of being “blacklisted”85 by the organ-
ization.86  This threat did fuel the passage of an anti-terror funding bill in 
the Iranian Parliament, but as FATF members only review fully-enacted 
legislation, Iran failed to meet the October deadline.87   
FATF did agree to extend extra time to Iran to complete reforms 
that would bring the country into line with global norms, but it currently 
remains unclear if Iran will be able to avoid pariah-status.88  Even if Iran 
can prevent the most extreme of FATF’s force, the country’s inability to 
move swiftly away from terror financing has undoubtedly worked to so-
lidify the fears of companies who are hesitant about working with Iran, 
including the EIB.89   
B. European Central Bank’s Unwillingness to Aid Iran in the 
Purchasing of Oil  
After the United States withdrew from the JCPOA, European of-
ficials were quick to maintain a commitment to Iran for the purchase oil, 
and this allegiance was extended by officials guaranteeing direct 
 
 83. Najmeh Bozorgmher, Iran’s Parliament Votes to Ratify UN Anti-Terror Funding 
Treaty, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/1aa2a208-ca20-11e8-9fe5-
24ad351828ab. 
 84. See id. (“Mohammad Ali Movahedi Kermani said . . . the FATF ‘is surely a danger-
ous thing’, which might prevent Iran from supporting its proxy forces in the region, notably 
Lebanon’s Hizbollah and Yemen’s Houthis.”). 
 85. A place on FATF’s blacklist would cement the reluctance of foreign investors and 
banks in dealing with Iran and could essentially ensure that European efforts to keep some 
financial channels open to Iran all but impossible.  Anti-Money-Laundering Body Gives Iran 
Until Feb to Complete Reforms, REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2018, 8:03 AM), https://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-iran-moneylaundering/anti-money-laundering-body-gives-iran-until-feb-
to-complete-reforms-idUSKCN1MT1OT. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.  
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payments from Europe to Iran.90  EU member states were subsequently 
pressured to bypass the U.S. financial system by dealing with oil pur-
chases from Iran exclusively in euros.91  For the purchase of oil to be 
feasible in euros, the central banks of Europe would have to transfer large 
sums directly to Iran’s central bank.92     
This facet of the EU’s plan was based on a notion that the United 
States would not be willing to sanction the central bank of an EU member 
state given the consequences that would likely follow.93  However, Euro-
pean central banks were much more hesitant to test the force behind 
Trump’s sanction enforcement threats.94  
The European Central Bank refused to directly transfer money to 
Tehran, alleging that such money transfers are incompatible with their 
mandate,95 and individual European national central banks are likely to 
follow suit.96  European national central banks are simply not likely to 
oblige to the EU’s request, and the EU does not have the authority to 
force their compliance.97 Additionally, European national central banks 
share the EIB’s and FATF’s concerns of indirectly aiding money laun-
dering or the funding of terrorism by transferring money to Iran’s Central 
Bank.98  European officials have not yet found a way to ease these fears. 
99  
C. The Impractical Assertion of the Blocking Statute 
Shortly after the United States announced it would be re-imple-
menting sanctions, the European Commission began the formal process 
of activating the European Union’s blocking statute.100  The blocking 
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statute was first adopted by the EU in 1996 in response to U.S. sanctions 
against Cuba and has historically only been activated to serve as a politi-
cal warning to the United States.101  The recent amending process revis-
ited the current list of blocking statute provisions to add protections on 
behalf of the European companies that have, or plan to, invest in Iran.102 
 The current version of the blocking statute is meant to protect 
European entities by theoretically creating an obligation for companies to 
alert the European Commission within 30 days should their economic or 
financial interests be negatively impacted, directly or indirectly, by U.S. 
sanctions.103  In the case that EU nationals and companies do have their 
interests adversely affected, the statute provides a right to recover lost 
compensation.104   The statute also bans the recognition of any court judg-
ment or decision that gives effect to U.S. Iranian sanction law105 and pro-
hibits EU organizations and persons from complying with U.S. sanc-
tions.106 
However, the EU presently does not have enough strength to 
make the blocking statute a useful tool in combating the impact of U.S. 
sanctions,107 given the great deal of legal uncertainty surrounding the stat-
ute.108  Certain provisions of the blocking statute are ambiguous, and 
there is consensus regarding the lack of practical application of the stat-
ute.109   
For example, the “right to compensation”110 clause could lead to 
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that one party terminated a contract as a result of U.S. sanctions to trigger 
the actual right to compensation would be difficult.112  Unless of course, 
the exiting party specifically stated they were withdrawing from the rela-
tionship due to the U.S. sanctions.113  
Further, the blocking statute, as currently constructed, puts EU 
companies that invested in a post-JCPOA Iran in a tricky position.114  If 
an entity continued business with Iran in breach of the sanctions, the busi-
ness would be cut off from the entirety of the U.S. financial system.115  
Yet if the company decided to leave Iran as a result of the sanctions, they 
would breach the blocking statute and be subsequently subject to EU pen-
alties.116  
Failure of the blocking statute to protect EU based companies ex-
tends past organizations with specific ties to U.S. markets.117  The EU has 
repeatedly discussed finding ways to support small- or medium -sized 
Iranian or EU enterprises that have limited or no exposure to U.S. finan-
cial markets.118  It has been suggested that supporting these sized entities 
could continue Iran’s economic growth, possibly keeping the Islamic Re-
public complaint to the standards set by the nuclear agreement.119  How-
ever, the success of small- or medium- sized organizations in maintaining 
the JCPOA, despite their independence from the U.S. financial market, 
seems unlikely given the blocking statute’s lack of protections.120  Even 
organizations with no interest in penetrating the U.S. market place may 
face significant difficulty in finding business partners, or financial back-
ing, to support their efforts.121  
V. A NEW SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE: INSTEX 
On January 31, 2019, INSTEX (Instrument for Supporting Trade 
Exchanges) became a registered SPV with France, Germany and the 
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United Kingdom (the “E3”) as initial shareholders.122  Given that the first 
tier of sanction blocking efforts failed,123 the EU decided it was in its best 
interest to create a new entity that would make it possible for companies 
to trade with Iran.124  The SPV is devised to facilitate financial transac-
tions and trade between European companies and Iran.125  Eventually, the 
SPV could be opened to other partners in the world.”126  INSTEX was 
registered in France and will be supervised by a Franco-German delega-
tion chaired by former Commerzbank Governor Per Fischer.127  
INSTEX will focus “initially on the sectors most essential to the 
Iranian population, such as pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and [food] 
goods.”128  The United States does not sanction these goods,129 but Euro-
pean banks have not facilitated exports of these products due to fears of 
American retribution.130 Applications of INSTEX may increase as the 
SPV shows its value, potentially being used to facilitate the trade of U.S. 
sanctioned commodities.131  
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At this time, technical details on INSTEX are still being deter-
mined.132  However, though SPV’s are most commonly known for their 
role in securitizing property-based assets,133 INSTEX  would likely work 
by offering a “compensation” service that coordinates payments between 
entities operating within the Islamic Republic.134  INSTEX could be spe-
cifically devised to facilitate transactions between European importers 
and exporters with ties to Iran, eliminating the necessity for any cross-
border payments.135  For example, a European exporter of goods to Iran 
would be able to have their payments coordinated by INSTEX so the ex-
porter would be able to be paid by a European organization working as 
an importer of goods from Iran.136  Ultimately this means that exporters 
would be paid from funds outside of Iran while importers would be paid 
by the funds within Iran.137  
No matter what technical form INSTEX takes, the SPV’s primary 
goals should remain centered around humanitarian purposes.138  Though 
trade within the essential goods market will not result in a significant fi-
nancial boost for the Islamic Republic, INSTEX may be enough to keep 
Iran content for a little longer while the European bloc continues to devise 
alternative methods to protect the Iranian economy.139  
Having essential goods promised by INSTEX could keep the Ira-
nian government from withdrawing from the JCPOA, at least in the im-
mediate future, for two main reasons.  First, an increase in essential goods 
could foster a greater sense of Iranian civility.140  In the past year, Iranians 
have taken to the streets almost daily to protest the government regarding 
the poor working and living conditions in the country141 and the re-estab-
lishment of sanctions has only progressively worsened Iranian civil 
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unrest.142  Essential supplies in Iran143 are so scarce that doctors at the 
MAHAK Pediatric Cancer and Treatment Research Center warned in No-
vember 2018 that by the end of January 2019, medicine shortages at the 
hospital would prevent the proper treatment of many children suffering 
from various types of cancers.144  Finding a way to restock the shelves 
with medicine, foods, and other essential products could give Iran the 
boost it so desperately needs to tamper down civilian unrest and continue 
JCPOA compliance.145 
Further, INSTEX, as announced, is theoretically immune to U.S. 
sanctions.146  If the U.S. tried to sanction INSTEX, the Trump Admin-
istration would have to explain why a channel providing medicines to 
Iran went against U.S. sanction policy and was not subject to an exemp-
tion.147  Denying medicine and food to sick children could be a public 
relations disaster for the Trump Administration.  
Second, INSTEX is meant to signal to Iran that the EU is truly 
committed to the preservation of the JCPOA.148  Given that Iran has 
grown frustrated with the EU’s inability to follow through on any of its 
sanction avoiding proposals, INSTEX could ensure that Iran continues to 
adhere to the regulations set by the nuclear agreement.149  It is possible 
that INSTEX could also signal that alternate SPVs could be created to 
facilitate other activities, such as exporting oil, in the future.150   
Future SPVs may be used to create “gateway banks.”151  A joint 
report by Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and Axel Hellman for the European 
Leadership Network argued that gateway banks could be part of the 
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viable solution the EU can pursue to avoid U.S. sanctions effectively.152  
Gateway banks are “financial institutions which can serve as intermedi-
aries between major Iranian and European commercial banks.”153  These 
gateway banks act as “intermediaries to international financial institu-
tions” from other countries wanting to work with Iran, such as China and 
Russia.154  EU officials have seemingly given credit to the idea and have 
stated that it is a possibility that SPVs could be granted a banking li-
cense.155  This method could make it more likely that the EU would be 
able to reach the oil sector once again, but gateway banks would have to 
be supported by other changes in EU infrastructure.156  
There are many basic uncertainties about INSTEX the E3 will 
need to address in the coming months before it becomes finalized.157  The 
E3 will need to clarify which type of activities are permissible.158  The 
E3 will have to provide assurance that companies using INSTEX are le-
gally protected against U.S. action.159  Additionally, the E3 will need to 
decide how much autonomy INSTEX will have and what level of trans-
parency the SPV must communicate.160  It will also be important for the 
E3 to figure out what exact role European governments are expected to 
play in financially supporting European commerce with Iran.161  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Many potential consequences accompany the implementation of 
INSTEX.162  Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, warned that the creation 
of such an  SPV would be “one of the most counterproductive measures 
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imaginable for regional and global peace and security.”163  While the an-
nounced format of INSTEX does not outwardly pose a high level of risk, 
it is possible that an SPV used for the transaction of other goods, such as 
oil, could not guarantee the same protections provided by commodities 
exchanged through U.S. supported entities.164  Given that SPV’s would 
require the support of new oversight protocol, it is possible terror-related, 
or money laundering activity could slip through the cracks.165  
There are other significant issues for the United States if the EU 
does establish a far-reaching SPV system beyond that of INSTEX.166  If 
SPVs are used to create a financial network that can bypass U.S. markets, 
U.S. financial dominance may be undermined.167  If U.S. financial dom-
inance is weakened, it will be less likely that the United States will be 
able to successfully impose and enforce unilateral sanctions moving for-
ward.168  
However, it is possible that the EU’s efforts to sustain the JCPOA 
could soon become moot.169  Reports are starting to surface from Iran that 
government officials have “lost trust” in the ability for Europeans to im-
plement a strategy significant enough to keep Iran interested in staying as 
part of the peace treaty.170  Fears that Iran will become impatient with 
European strategies to salvage Iran’s economy and withdraw from the 
JCPOA to restart their nuclear program have been exacerbated by the re-
cent attempted Iranian group hacking of many nuclear scientist’s data.171   
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If the EU hopes to continue to keep Iran from returning to the of nuclear 
their commitment to salvage the JCPOA, INSTEX may not be enough.172  
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